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The Impact of Multinational Enterprises on Public Governance Institutions in Areas of 
Limited Statehood 
 
1. Introduction 
Following the worldwide movement calling for responsible global corporate citizenry, there has 
been a shift in thinking about the role and involvement of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in 
areas of limited statehood. There is a growing expectation of transparency in MNE dealings with 
such governments and more active corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, focused on 
capacity building and development (Bondy, Moon, & Matten, 2012; Cash, 2012; Cormier et al., 
2016; Nijhof, de Bruijn, & Honders, 2008).  However, because the state is often unwilling or 
unable to provide basic services, facilities and infrastructure, local populations have come to 
expect these tasks to be carried out by MNEs operating in their area that often reluctantly comply 
(Cash, 2012; Dahan et al., 2010; George et al., 2016; Rivera-Santos et al., 2012). This has 
blurred the distinction between where the responsibilities of the MNE starts and ends, and has 
led to the creation of hybrid organizations, and innovative partnerships which seeks to engage 
with stakeholders and contribute towards broader development goals (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015, 
2016; Pittz & Intindola, 2015; Wagner Mainardes, Alves, & Raposo, 2012; Williams & 
Shepherd, 2016). Our focus is at a more aggregate level about when, how and why a MNE may 
opt for a more engaged approach as opposed to a more transactional one in a post-conflict 
setting. 
 
We explore the impact of MNEs on public governance institutions in regions of limited 
statehood by focusing on three areas of inquiry: firstly, the impact of MNE involvement in these 
 3 
countries; secondly, the mechanisms and levels through which MNEs engage with external 
governance processes; and lastly, the strategic motivation for the mode and level of engagement. 
We use detailed case studies of four MNEs that are active in Afghanistan. There is a dearth of 
research on the specific roles and effects that MNEs have played in the Afghan reconstruction 
process, or analysis of the process and experience at the organizational level. What does exist is 
studies on efforts to determine and justify reconstruction and development agendas (McKechnie, 
2003), comparisons on development practice, as implemented in Afghanistan, with development 
and reconstruction theory (Barakat & Chard, 2002; Ritchie, 2016), assessment of the 
contribution and effects of donor aid and development programs (Koehler & Zürcher, 2007), 
analysis of state-building theory and practice in Afghanistan (Debiel et al., 2009), evaluation of 
the possible impacts of natural resource extraction for development and reconstruction agendas, 
and analysis of the challenges and hopes for private sector development (Shroder, 2008). This 
study therefore provides a unique perspective on a topic that is important to large parts of the 
developing world and a region which has long played a vital role as a crossroads between 
civilizations and trade routes (Kidd, 2007). 
 
Understanding how and why non-state actors, like MNEs, interact with institutions and affect 
public governance institutions in areas of limited statehood will serve to help better understand 
the role and functions of business in any modern society, and to apportion such roles with 
commensurate responsibilities. It fills a gap in that it grows the still limited body of work on the 
range and influence of collaborative engagement across sectors to meet the challenges of 
development and security, especially in areas of limited statehood. Such understanding, in turn, 
will enrich discussions regarding the complexity of doing business in increasingly turbulent 
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times especially in countries with weak institutions, high levels of uncertainty and instability 
(George et al., 2016; Kreiser & Marino, 2002). These environments are not only relevant for 
fragile or failed states but exist in many developing countries. The research thus carries import 
beyond the extreme cases of limited statehood. The results reveal a relationship between the 
depth of country embeddedness and the level of engagement of MNEs with public institutions 
and this is related to issues around risk mitigation and time horizons. Deeper embeddedness in 
the local markets brings greater exposure to risk leading to more and wider engagement in 
governance processes and cross sector collaborations in order to influence these concerns. We 
reveal two models of MNE engagement in these areas of limited statehood, namely an embedded 
versus autonomous model and examine their implications. 
 
2. Literature review  
Areas of limited statehood refer to those geographical or functional parts of any state where its 
domestic sovereignty, which determines that state’s ability to enforce collectively binding 
decisions or exercise a monopoly over the use of violence, or both, is curtailed along territorial, 
sectoral, social or temporal dimensions (Börzel & Risse, 2010: 119). Thus the context of the 
study is as much conceptual as it is geographical and temporal. Bennett (2001: 13) captures the 
essence of the complexity of the context and the importance of this study in the following 
statement: 
One of the realities of doing business in the global marketplace is that managers in 
multinational corporations find themselves operating in areas of armed conflict, 
indigenous cultural disputes, epidemic disease and other kinds of social upheaval. As 
globalization of the world’s economy continues, the international business community 
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will increasingly find itself confronted with the challenge of promoting peacebuilding in 
its areas of operation, or being blamed for contributing to the conditions that lead to 
violent conflict. These new challenges will increasingly require business professionals to 
apply conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategies in situations where promoting 
peace is an essential element of successful business operations. 
We use the term ‘limited statehood’ broadly to describe the relevant quality of states that are at 
times described as being weak, failing or failed, post-conflict or war-torn and even beyond that 
as we explain below (Gisselquist, 2014; Zulueta‐Fülscher, 2014). 
 
2.1 Institutional voids and MNEs in areas of limited statehood 
Institutional theory argues that institutions matter (both formal and informal) and impacts not 
only firms but the broader economic progress of countries. The institutional rules of the game 
affect the transaction costs of exchange activities and provide certainty and predictability for the 
business environment. Conflict can disrupt these institutions and there is a mounting acceptance 
that in the presence of institutional voids that MNEs must engage in novel cross-sector 
partnerships so as to compensate for these institutional gaps (George et al., 2016; Kolk & 
Lenfant, 2015). Rivera-Santos et al. (2012: 1726) state that in the absence of regulative 
institutions, alternative government mechanisms, such as informal contracts and in–kind 
contributions, which rely on normative and cognitive institutions, arise. This suggests that as 
institutional distance between home and host country increases, the importance of these 
substitute mechanisms will also increase. Furthermore, MNEs by sharing control over their 
activities with other actors, and particularly non-market actors, are able to help address these 
institutional gaps because they can take on roles occupied elsewhere by traditional institutional 
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actors. This places a premium on the abilities of MNEs to collaborate across organizational 
boundaries (Rivera-Santos and Rufin, 2010: 136). These cross-sector collaborations can result in 
new perspectives on learning and innovation especially at the base of the pyramid where formal 
institutions struggle to penetrate in many developing countries (Murphy, Perrot, & Rivera-
Santos, 2012).  
 
Others contend that while corporations should be held accountable for their actions, their 
accountability should be understood within the proper limits of corporate responsibility for 
addressing institutional voids (Cash, 2012). They state that it is important to distinguish between 
corporate responsibility and corporate accountability in order to avoid unrealistic expectations 
from stakeholders and to mitigate divergence of expectations between MNEs and their 
stakeholders regarding the appropriate role and responsibilities of MNEs in areas of limited 
statehood. Furthermore, they argue that MNEs are not development organizations and their role 
in areas of limited statehood is to contribute to and/or reinforce existing socio-economic 
development or state-led development policy, not to replace it (Cash, 2012). The challenge for 
MNEs is to develop frameworks for partnerships that minimize the negative impacts while 
enhancing their positive contribution to reconstruction and development and build sustainability 
by fostering domestic capacity and leadership (Abrahamov, 2010: 483). 
 
In contexts of fragile states beset by violent conflict, MNEs need to decide whether and how they 
might respond to this violence facilitated by institutional weakness. Rosenau et al. (2009) 
summarize the strategic responses of MNEs in areas of limited statehood, in order to reduce their 
risk exposure, to the following: choosing to do little beyond ensuring the physical security of the 
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business premises; shaping operating environments through social investment and community 
development initiatives; determining operating environments by engaging in a form of state-
building, through enhancing the capacity of governing authorities, workshops on good 
governance issues and making FDI conditional on the state undertaking corrective state action, or 
refraining from engaging in specified behavior; incorporating internal ‘soft’ security measures, 
like the voluntary adoption of human rights principles, codes, guidelines, and implementing 
procedures; and developing and fostering community relations through special programs. 
However, MNEs choose to respond there is no question that they are affected by institutional 
voids in fragile states but likewise that they, too, impact on institutions in these contexts (Luiz 
and Stewart, 2014). 
 
Williamson and Shepherd (2016) argue that in the aftermath of catastrophic events, organizations 
can contribute towards the redevelopment challenge in one of two approaches. The first, which 
they refer to as sustaining ventures, adopt a more transactional approach with more distant 
relations with various stakeholders. The second approach, they term transformational ventures, 
are able to leverage relationships to satisfy additional needs, which generate subsequent 
interactions and allow beneficiaries to continue to grow. Their study focuses on the building of 
resilience after the Haiti earthquake and how organizations were able to meaningfully contribute 
towards this grand challenge. We examine how this applies in the context of a fragile and 
conflict affected area such as Afghanistan. The research is firmly embedded within institutional 
theory in its focus on how organizations adapt to institutional structures and shape them. Even in 
areas of limited statehood, we show that actors learn to cope with inefficient state institutions and 
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find alternative ways of governance and as a result new forms of collective action emerge (Risse 
& Börzel, 2015). 
 
3. Research methodology 
This study explores the effects of MNEs on governance institutions in areas of limited statehood 
from an organizational level in Afghanistan. We follow an applied qualitative research approach, 
drawing on the principles of case study design, through interviews with executives that were 
involved in setting up four MNEs in Afghanistan and engaging with their institutional 
stakeholders on an ongoing basis (Guercini, 2014). We considered several factors in selecting 
our cases. We wanted to focus on larger companies and therefore the MNEs selected were all 
amongst the largest players in their respective sectors within the country. We also wanted to 
differentiate between the effects of different home country environments and different sectors so 
as to get a varied description of MNE engagement within Afghanistan which allows us to engage 
with institutional theory as to how institutions shape the behavior of agents and organizations. 
Our cases therefore come from four different home countries and from four different sectors. 
Another factor considered for case selection was that they had to be in operation within 
Afghanistan for a period of time so that we would be able to explore their involvement over time 
and how they potentially adapted to changing circumstances. A final practical factor was access 
to respondents which is nontrivial in a complex and contested environment such as this. 
 
The study utilizes semi-structured interviews with key respondents, but also observations by the 
researchers during the extended fieldwork, and documents, records, minutes of meetings, and 
other documentary sources, where available to provide for triangulation. Interviews were 
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recorded, with permission, and were then transcribed. The transcriptions were analyzed 
separately using content analysis procedures based upon our understanding of institutional theory 
of how and why institutions emerge in particular contexts and how they shaped the behavior of 
organizations and vice versa. We initially coded the data into the categories according to our 
three areas of enquiry, namely the impact of the MNE involvement in these countries, the 
mechanisms and levels through which they engage with external governance processes and how 
they create new governance structures within these particular institutional environments, and the 
strategic motivation for the mode and level of engagement. We then created subcategories and 
coded the units in line with the categories to produce relevant themes. 
 
The interviews were pre-arranged through correspondence and conducted in person in Kabul, 
Afghanistan during August-November of 2013. However, one of the authors spent several 
additional months in Kabul both before and after the interviews to more deeply understand the 
post-conflict context and to explore how companies were engaging with their economic activities 
and with local communities. The semi-structured nature of the research instrument and open-
ended questions allowed sufficient scope to explore avenues of interest as they presented 
themselves and to explore concepts, themes and relationships. Our primary respondents in each 
of the MNEs were senior executives involved in both strategic and operational governance. 
Follow up interviews were conducted telephonically or via Skype for issues of clarification 
which arose during the coding process. 
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4. Presentation and discussion of results 
4.1 Background to Afghanistan 
The Afghan context is one of extremely limited statehood. Afghanistan has been referred to as a 
‘modern protectorate’, in the sense that external actors have effective control over parts of its 
territory or policy areas (Börzel & Risse, 2010). With a population of 32.5 million people and a 
reported GDP of approximately $19 billion in 2015, Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries 
in the Central Asian region (World Bank, 2016a). An estimated 27% of Afghans have access to 
safe drinking water and only 5% to adequate sanitation. The Afghan government estimates that 
approximately 30% of Afghans have access to electricity from grid-based power, micro-hydro, 
or solar panel stations, with some major urban centers, like Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, only 
recently enjoying mostly uninterrupted electricity supply for the first time in decades (World 
Bank, 2016a). 
 
The institutional challenges in Afghanistan predate the last three decades of civil conflict – 
reports from the 1970s indicate that Afghanistan’s public institutions were weak even at that time 
(McKechnie, 2003). The civil service still consists in part of the empty shells of defunct state 
enterprises and is plagued by ingrained attitudes inherited from Afghanistan’s experiment with 
Soviet-style socialism, compounded by widespread and entrenched patronage in the civil-service 
appointment system (McKechnie, 2003). Reconstruction efforts over the last decade have done 
little to turn formal governance in Afghanistan around. Afghanistan ranks 177 out of 189 
economies in the Doing Business 2016 rankings for ease of doing business (World Bank, 2016b), 
and jointly second last, in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015 
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(Transparency International, 2016). It therefore represents an extreme case of institutional 
pathologies and limited statehood for MNE engagement. 
 
4.2 Background to the participating company case studies 
MNE1 is a for-profit deposit-taking microfinance institution and bank. Its holding company is 
considered to be the largest deposit-taking microfinance institution (MFI) in Afghanistan, with 
an outstanding loan portfolio of approximately $80 million and 54,000 individual depositors. 
While it operates as a corporate and commercial bank, its focus is mainly on microfinance and 
small business loan products. The MNE1’s parent organization has channeled more than 
U.S.$700 million into Afghanistan. It has 37 branches in 13 provinces across Afghanistan, and 
employs close to a thousand direct employees, of which less than 10 are expatriates.  
 
MNE2 is in the defence and security sector and specializes in information and technical services, 
in particular base operations and installation support services. Its parent company is a global 
leader in Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance related products and systems and information and technical services, supplying 
government and commercial customers worldwide. Its annual turnover is $5.5 billion, and is 
listed on the NYSE, and is on the Forbes Fortune 500 list of top companies.  
 
MNE3 is in the government services sector, and the architecture and engineering services market 
in particular. Its parent company is a British multinational consultancy, engineering and project 
management company that operates in approximately 40 countries in the oil and gas, mining, 
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clean energy, and environment and infrastructure markets. Its annual revenue is £4.2 billion and 
is listed on the London Stock Exchange as a member of the FTSE 100 index.  
 
MNE4 is the second largest of four mobile telecommunications providers in Afghanistan with 
5.2 million subscribers. MNE4 is owned (91% shareholding) by a subsidiary of the South 
African-based MNE4 parent company. It has four offices in Kabul, customer service points 
throughout Afghanistan, and coverage of 33 out of 34 provinces in the country. It employs 489 
people. MNE4’s parent company operates in 22 countries, with almost 190 million subscribers 
across Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. Its annual revenue is approximately $13.9 
billion.  
 
4.3 The effects of MNEs on institutions in failed states 
Our participating MNEs adopted strategic responses to overcome institutional voids and reduce 
their risk exposure. We find that these responses vary along a continuum of internal strategic 
realignment to external action aimed at shaping the institutional context of the company, in line 
with that predicated on institutional theory. These interactions between MNEs and the 
institutions governing it (or that should be governing it) could have either positive or negative 
consequences, both of which may not necessarily be entirely intended or anticipated at the time 
of engagement. From the responses we were able to extract the following themes as regards the 
positive effects of MNE involvement in Afghanistan – see Table 1. The most common theme is 
that of transferring technology, and skills or best practices upon their institutional context. The 
MNEs refer to the improved sophistication of the institutional context as a result of the private 
sector development that has taken place, and through them setting professional business 
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benchmarks, and pushing the state to train their own staff in order to be able to engage with the 
MNEs in a meaningful way. Furthermore, their successes in a region of limited statehood act as a 
strong signal and motivation for other MNEs to enter the market, opening it up to competition, 
and ultimately development.  
 
The results of our interviews relate back to the literature on MNE engagement in fragile states 
and how they are able to affect institutional development in these contexts (Abramov, 2010; 
Dahan et al., 2010; Getz & Oetzel, 2010; Kolk & Lenfant, 2015, 2016). We see them 
‘thickening’ markets by developing the private sector and bringing new perspectives to their 
organizational development. Technology transfers occur through collaborative partnerships with 
government agencies, NGOs, the nascent local business community, and other hybrid 
organizations. 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
From the responses we were also able to extract the following themes as regards the negative 
effects of MNE involvement in Afghanistan – see Table 2. There was an acknowledgement that 
MNEs can reinforce corruption and pathological institutions through their behavior and 
influence. This was especially likely to occur where MNEs adopted a short term approach to 
their investment horizon. As can be expected, all four MNEs acknowledged the potential 
negative consequences of MNEs in the context of limited statehood, but perceived these to be 
perpetrated by others rather than themselves, although a number of comments hint to their 
involvement in perpetuating negative institutional cycles. Where these were acknowledged it was 
very much seen as a consequence of institutional voids and limited state reach which necessitated 
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unconventional approaches to doing business and succumbing to local ‘norms’. Here they saw 
themselves more as institution takers which ties into new institutional theory about how 
organizations conform to the prevailing environment through processes of institutional 
isomorphism. Our work supports prior research (Evans, 2007; Subedi, 2013) on the potentially 
negative consequences for host countries that result from a lack of MNEs meaningfully engaging 
with local development and adopting a hit-and-run approach of short-termism and exploitative 
profiteering. This often manifests in the reinforcement of corrupt institutional practices, the 
exploitation of valuable natural resources without linkages into the rest of the economy, the 
fostering of a conflict economy and co-opting of warlords, the creation of state dependency on 
MNE benefactors, patronage affording undue influence on regulatory processes, and social 
unrest as a result of environmental impacts and unfair labor practices. 
Insert Table 2 
 
4.4 Mechanisms of engagement with institutions 
As predicated in institutional theory, our MNEs engage their institutional contexts through a 
variety of mechanisms. MNE1 and MNE4 are far more engaged and use a greater variety of 
mechanisms than MNE2 and MNE3. Engaging with government and local communities and 
various collaborative partnerships appear most frequently in the responses – see Table 3. Our 
results support institutional theory that organizations are deeply affected by local institutional 
frameworks and that context influences economic behavior. Where institutions are ineffective in 
reducing uncertainty and signaling what conduct is legitimate and which is not, organizations 
may engage in opportunistic behavior or seek to contribute towards the building of institutional 
capacity.  
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We see MNEs finding inventive ways to overcome institutional voids by engaging in cross-
sector collaborations. These include formal and informal ties with the government, and 
individuals within the government. The latter is often necessary where the state institutions move 
slowly and may need personal ‘nudges’ which draw on networks of social capital. The 
collaborations extend beyond the formal and often require MNEs to engage below the 
institutional surface with local village communities and local customs. By engaging in cross-
sector partnerships they are able to mitigate institutional voids by drawing on complimentary 
capabilities from other actors and thereby fill in the spaces left by these voids. There is 
recognition that given the complexity of the local environment it is not possible to go it alone 
and that cross-sector alliances are constructive as all these actors are likely to face similar 
challenges but have different strengths and approaches to dealing with these voids (Kolk and 
Lenfant, 2016).  
Insert Table 3 
 
4.5 Embedded versus autonomous models of MNE engagement with institutions 
The thematic analysis that emerged from the interviews indicate that a company’s level of 
engagement is largely determined by their understanding and tolerance of risk, the depth of its 
embeddedness in the market, and the company’s economic viability in the country. Two models 
emerged from our case studies, namely an embedded and an autonomous model. 
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a) Embedded model 
MNE1 and MNE4 reflect the embedded model of MNE engagement with the institutions of 
governance in Afghanistan. They are comparatively highly engaged and this can be seen through 
their organizational footprint including the number of local employees, the nature and number of 
its products/services/programs, its clients/beneficiaries, the size of its capital investment and its 
indefinite investment horizon. They serve Afghan clients directly and do not have external 
agencies to insulate them from the risks of operating in an environment of limited statehood. 
They therefore have to engage with institutions and attempt to develop them as their long term 
viability depends upon the overall success of the country and the ability of the institutions to 
provide them with a sound and predictable business milieu. In this context, they attempt to create 
community buy-in and making positive impacts on the institutional environment, such as through 
private sector development, and collective engagement in policy dialogue. The nature of their 
industries requires them to be fully embedded within the broader economy of the country they 
operate in: 
[I]f your presence is driven by community embracement … a lot of security risk already 
goes down. Because when people start to own you they start to take responsibility for 
you. So I think that has played a major role in ensuring the safety of [our] infrastructure. 
... If the community does not like you, you don't get the security, irrespective of how 
good the country is. 
 
b) Autonomous model 
MNE2 and MNE3 reflect the autonomous model of MNE engagement with the institutions of 
governance in Afghanistan. They operate largely in a socio-political and economic vacuum and 
 17 
parachute in their business models through external agencies. They are insulated from the normal 
business and security environment by operating figuratively within the ‘green zone’. They do not 
seek to engage in institutional development as part of their long term planning as they have 
shorter investment horizons. They are often in the business of trading off institutional voids in 
the most fragile regions of the world (Luiz et al., 2017). 
 
The nature of their services is such that they do not need to have much exposure to or 
engagement with the wider Afghan population or environment. Their risk mitigation strategies 
are often aligned to heavily secured compounds, sharing intelligence through informal networks 
and engaging the institutional context through intermediaries. They do not believe that there is 
much that they can do to assure institutional sustainability in Afghanistan. There are some 
obvious overlaps with how certain industries operate, most especially extractive industries. We 
often see mining and oil companies operating in developing countries in economic vacuums and 
existing in their own physical compounds with private security firms. The autonomous model 
thus carries import beyond the immediate context of these two cases. 
 
Both MNEs see their level of engagement in Afghanistan as being determined by their alignment 
with their client’s objectives and performing their contract. They do not consider institutional 
development as directly relevant and consider delivering shareholder value as their primary 
consideration for moving into and out of areas of limited statehood. A quote from MNE3 is 
illustrative: 
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You’re following business. We're not a charity we have to give our shareholders value 
and we can only give them value where we know our services are needed and we're going 
to get paid.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to address a perceived gap in research regarding our 
understanding of the impact of MNEs on public governance institutions in areas of limited 
statehood. Our analysis of the four case companies revealed a complex relationship between the 
MNEs and institutions in fragile states. The results of our case studies reveal two very different 
models of engagement by MNEs (embedded versus autonomous) in areas of limited statehood. 
We do not argue that these are the only models but rather they represent how our particular case 
studies responded to the extreme environment of Afghanistan. It is likely that they form part of a 
continuum and that other cases will demonstrate more of a mix in their level of engagement with 
indigenous institutions depending upon local conditions. Our work builds on that of Williamson 
and Shepherd (2016) and their models of sustaining and transformational ventures. We find that 
the deeper a MNE is embedded in a local context, the more exposed it is to risk or structural 
issues in the market that might threaten the MNE’s business viability. If a company is both 
deeply embedded and exposed to risk, it is more inclined to address the risk or structural issue 
through engaging in processes that would lessen the source of risk. In areas of limited statehood 
these threats often arise as a result of the governance constraints and the only way to address 
these are to engage with institutions of governance through partnerships and hybrid 
organizational models (Forrer & Katsos, 2015; Kolk & Lenfant, 2015, 2016).  For MNEs which 
have a long-term orientation to doing business in areas of limited statehood, and therefore need 
 19 
to address the underlying ‘grand challenges’ (George et al., 2016: 1882) of these environments, 
an embedded approach that engages with local institutions and collaborative efforts is better 
suited towards both the sustainability of the company and its domestic impact. 
 
Our work builds on institutional theory by demonstrating that in environments where there are 
multiple and competing institutional logics, as a result of a lack of formal, hierarchical 
governance structures in areas of limited statehood, that organizations develop alternative 
governance mechanisms to overcome collective action problems and bring about new forms of 
cooperation (Risse & Börzel, 2015). Our embedded model demonstrates MNEs engaging with 
various levels of institutions, both formal and informal, and co-creating new ones that seek to 
create generalized trust in “imagined communities” of overlapping memberships, despite 
dysfunctional state institutions (Risse & Börzel, 2015). These new institutional structures and 
practices reflect responses to the underlying environmental pathologies and build on the socio-
political and cultural conventions of that milieu. 
 
The research contributes to institutional theory and demonstrates the interplay between 
organizations and the institutional surroundings. MNEs in Afghanistan are deeply affected by 
institutional weakness which contribute towards greater uncertainty and impact their behavior, 
but MNEs also have a direct bearing on institutions. We demonstrate a number of strategic 
responses by MNEs to institutional voids incorporating those raised by Rosenau et al. (2009). 
We theorize that their choice of institutional engagement is influenced by the nature of the 
industry (including how they interact with clients), the extent to which they can contract with 
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agents to ‘outsource’ risks and interaction with indigenous institutions, and the time horizons 
which affect how they see their role within the country. 
 
5.1 Implications and future research 
In terms of implications, our research carries importance not only for the extreme cases of areas 
of limited statehood but also in developing countries more generally where there are often 
institutional voids and high levels of political risk. It also has sectoral implications. Where 
institutional voids exist we are more likely to see the ‘embedded’ model appear where MNEs 
need to engage with local consumers and stakeholders directly, whilst the ‘autonomous’ model is 
more likely to materialize where the industry is more insulated from consumers and the citizenry. 
In developing countries, the ‘autonomous’ model is most probable with the extractive sectors 
such as mining and oil and gas. These sectors often exist in vacuums with few backward and 
forward linkages into the domestic economy. This also ties into the literature on the ‘resource 
curse’ which often accompanies resource rich countries. MNEs may invest in these areas for 
quick returns with little regard for local communities and the result is repeatedly systems of 
corruption, rent-seeking and patronage. These are not only issues of theoretical but also of 
practical importance. MNEs may become part of the problem in these systems as they further 
weaken fragile institutions and prop up illegitimate governments. In fragile and conflict affected 
states MNEs can contribute towards peace- and institution-building and reinforce cycles of 
positive development, or they can further pathological behavior and contribute to conflict. MNEs 
are increasingly going to be expected to step into the gaps associated with institutional voids and 
this will require a different approach to doing business and their choice of approach will have a 
direct bearing on social outcomes in host countries. 
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A number of areas lend themselves to further study. First, the dynamic process through which 
MNEs are both affected by institutions and impact on their development through complex webs 
is an important future direction for research. Second, how MNE engagement with local 
institutions affect the broader dynamics of conflict and development needs exploration, as new 
hybrid orders may create winners and losers posing new risks to stability. Lastly, there are 
questions, from a policy perspective, regarding the role of business in peacebuilding in these 
areas of limited statehood, and whether business can contribute to the development process and, 
if so, whether there is an optimal phasing of policy reforms which can enhance the role of 
business. 
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Table 1: Positive effects of MNE involvement in Afghanistan 
Themes Relevant Quote Respondent 
Technology or 
skills transfer and 
best practice 
benchmarking 
(4MNEs) 
 
- The more you are coming with professional arguments, the more they are 
obliged to train their staff in order really to debate with us. … We brought a new 
way of doing business with them. 
- For the folks that actually work with us I think it's tremendous because we do 
teach them, first of all, rule of law things, that you just don't do that. … I've been 
out to the other sites and I tell you, Kandahar is nothing like Kabul, and I think a 
major reason why is because the multinationals aren't out there and they're stuck 
in their old ways, and they're not going to progress.  
MNE4 
 
 
 
 
MNE3 
 
 
 
 
Community 
building and 
fostering social 
and human capital 
(4 MNEs) 
[I]t helps if you have a successful telecom sector in any country, it helps really 
develop a lot the country, it helps the people open up, it helps the people 
communicate better, it helps them have access more to information, to the world, 
and having access to ideas that will help them really grow their business. 
MNE4 
Private sector 
development  
(3 MNEs) 
Before [we] came no multinational company was interested in coming. After us, 
you see that [others] became interested to come. 
 
MNE4 
Infrastructure 
development 
(3 MNEs) 
[W]e are interested in all emerging markets, especially countries like 
Afghanistan, where they were in a state of war and then... go into a phase or 
process of construction and rebuilding and developing the infrastructure.  
MNE4 
Value-added 
employment 
(3 MNEs) 
Because of that inflow there’s a capacity development of the local staff that takes 
place. Because business continuity can only be managed if the ratio of the local 
staff is bigger than that of the expatriate staff. That is the biggest contribution that 
I see from the international community besides the donor money that has come. 
MNE1 
 
 
Peace-building 
through 
development  
(1 MNE) 
[Our] involvement in Afghanistan contributes to private sector development leads 
to economic stability, which will ‘translate into peace. 
MNE1 
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Table 2: Negative effects of MNE involvement in Afghanistan 
Themes Relevant Quote Respondent 
Reinforcement of poor 
governance and 
corruption 
(4 MNEs) 
- You’d better be prepared to [deal with local power brokers and pay them to 
get things done], because otherwise you’re not going to succeed. You’re just 
not; it's just a fact of life in Afghanistan. You will have to pay somebody 
something at some point. 
- I can't really say that we would’ve necessarily had an impact there, if 
anything, I would venture to guess because we end up, I used a word 
‘succumbing’, to their demands, because we really have no other option in 
order to continue to operate, and that probably continues to feed the beast. 
MNE3 
 
 
 
 
MNE2 
 
 
Short-termism and 
exploitative 
profiteering (2 MNEs) 
You've got some short term projects which provide immediate opportunities 
but without long term sustainability … and that brings in a lot of instability. 
 
MNE1 
Unsustainable market 
distortions 
(2 MNEs) 
Well, anytime we have a big influx of military and by extension contractors ... 
then you’re going to have a big influx of a lot of money and then there’s going 
to be almost a false economy built. … So when all that begins to draw down 
and pull out, you find out their GDP was really 50% U.S. government or the 
Corps of Engineers. And then when that stops, wages are going to come 
crashing down and there are going to be high unemployment, so it's probably 
not a good thing. 
MNE2 
 
Draining of talent  
(2 MNEs) 
The U.S. Government has a program – that special immigrant visa program – 
which you could consider is working at odds with what we hoped to gain in 
Afghanistan, that’s the cream rise to the top and some really competent people 
or the younger generation maybe take hold of things here in 10 or 20 years, but 
unfortunately it seems like a lot of the competent personnel are doing whatever 
they can to get a special immigrant visa to the U.S. and other Western 
countries. 
MNE2 
Unfair labor practices 
(1 MNE) 
I think one of the negative effects, and it's hard to do it otherwise, is the 
disparity in pay, you know. You can't pay an Afghan what you pay an expat … 
so you bring that very real sense of inequality to them. 
MNE2 
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Table 3: Mechanisms of engagement with the institutional context by MNEs in Afghanistan 
Themes Relevant Quote Respondent 
Nurturing 
Government 
Relationships 
(4 MNEs) 
- We have a very good [longstanding] relationship [with the] Deputy Minister of the 
Interior, who we meet with regularly and the beauty of this relationship is he’s never 
once asked for money or a favor or anything, and never has. And how he’s helped is, 
we have these big generators that we put on sites for temporary power when the power 
goes out. When we go to get it, the local commanders won’t let us take our property, 
and we go and see him and say ‘hey, we need some help’ and he picks up the phone 
and calls the commander and now we get our generator back. So, it's been productive. 
- The need to establish and leverage business and personal relationships comes with 
doing business in contexts like Afghanistan: [Let’s say] you applied for certain work 
permit for an expatriate, it gets suddenly complicated and you have to go to the 
minister and sometimes to the Presidential office in order to solve your problem. You 
cannot live here without personal relationship and business relationship mixed. [But] 
we don't bribe, we don't corrupt people, we don't give favors.  
MNE2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MNE4 
Community 
Engagement (3 
MNEs) 
If you’re going to go do a project, your first step better be to go to the village elders 
and say okay here’s what we're planning to do and throw it out to them, and say, what 
are the pitfalls, what do I need to look out for, who do I need to take care of? Yeah 
you better do that, or I guarantee you won't get very far.  
MNE3 
Engaging in a 
development 
role (2 MNEs) 
[We] play a major role in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. The 
reason being that it brings in a lot of stability for the underserved sector of 
Afghanistan. 
MNE1 
Private sector 
collaboration 
(2 MNEs) 
You’re a part of these associations. They are your voice in front of the government. If 
there are any issues, it's probably the whole sector that is facing that issue, then you 
need to advocate your case in front of the government through these respective 
agencies. 
MNE1 
CSR programs 
(1 MNE) 
We believe that when we help developing society it will help the economy develop 
and at the end the business sector will develop, so it's a cycle… a long term 
sustainability [issue]. If you end up with people not having the means, we end up 
losing our business. So when you help the society you are developing the economy 
and in the end you are developing your own business at the same time. You know 
when you make social activities, it's kind of brand strategy at the same time you are 
doing. But it depends how: if you don't believe in what you are doing, it won’t reach 
the people; and in the end you won't create the bond between you as a sector and the 
people. If you are serious about it, you will benefit, the people will benefit, your brand 
will benefit. A good base is you believe in what you are doing and you are serious 
really in helping people and not just to put some advertising on the TV that you 
distributed rice. 
MNE4 
 
